FOREIGN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
________
The Idea of the State in Yugoslavia
SUMMARY
I. - From Stalinism to Titoism.
II. - Attempt at a doctrinal construction of Titoism. III. - Link between the law and the state.
IV. - Conditions for the Emergence of the state and the law. V. - Role of the State.
VI. - The idea of class.
VII. - The possibility of autonomous state action.
IX. - The characteristics of a socialist state.
X. - The evolution of the USSR: in conflict with Yugoslavia.
XI. - The idea of party in the Yugoslav state.
XII, XIII, & XIV - Interpretation of the present situation of the Yugoslav state.
I. From Stalinism to Titoism
The federal Yugoslav Worker's Republic, which, since August 1945 (the approximate date of its founding) until June 1948 (the date of its excommunication from the Cominform community) was a satellite of the USSR, could do nothing but adopt the theories of the reigning state during this era, that is to say the theories of the Stalinist period(1). That is why, in the Yugoslav law faculties, where the general theory of law is assigned as a compulsory subject, the said soviet theories were taught directly, the works of their authors having been rapidly translated. Therefore, a state and a law was taught and studied that was not at all native, because, the economic and political reality of Yugoslavia at that time was, if only for historical reasons, very different from that of the Soviet Union. The rulers of the USSR, regarding themselves as the champions of socialism, believed themselves to be in possession of a monopoly of knowledge and thinking that their friends, true or false, could well do nothing but faithfully follow them. But this phenomenon was explained equally by the fact that the Yugoslav teaching profession, having been caught short by the proletarian revolution, did not have the time necessary to prepare themselves ideologically, while the employees who, later, had to replace or infiltrate them, were not yet ready, because of the youth of the Yugoslav Communist Party, which was constantly renewed by Stalin.
This first Yugoslav period, that one can call "Soviet" has, therefore, been almost identical to the "Stalinist" period in the USSR.
After the expulsion of the Yugoslav regime from he socialist camp by the famous resolution of the Communist Information Bureau of June 1948, this made for disarray in the general theory of Yugoslav law. The Soviet writers of whatever era they were, no longer had a stake in this country. The Yugoslav writers, having done nothing until then but explicate their Russian "classics", had not done anything original or personal in this field. What did they do then? They simply made extracts of Marx, Engels, and Lenin's works concerning the right of the state, linking somehow or other these extracts with, here and there, some timid commentaries, and delivered them, in the form of "Outline of Studies", to their students(2).
This situation lasted until 1953, when, after the promulgation of the new Constitution and the final consolidation of the regime which from then on bore the name Titoism, one saw appear in this material some works of Yugoslav making.
The number of these works, however, is not large and the authors have not made these works truly personal. The most remarkable among them is, certainly, that of a professor on the Law Faculty of Belgrade, R. Loukitch. In addition to a certain number of articles published in different magazines in his country, he is the author of a General Theory of Law and the State, in two volumes(3).
II. Attempt at a Doctrinal Construction of Titoism
Marxist above all, this work captures all the known themes of this trend of ideas, which it systematizes and develops, to make a coherent doctrine of elaborate social phenomena. A similar effort has already been tried, it should be remembered, by a certain number of Soviet jurists and, as their works are known, one would have thought that an explanation of these ideas of Yugoslav jurists on this same subject would be, all in all, a useless repetition. This is partially true, true above all for the part which concerns the writings of Marx, Engles, Lenin and Stalin. But, just as the Soviet jurists have enriched the rather fragmentary Marxist doctrine of the law and of the state, which emerges from the unique works of Marx and Engles, in making them more consistent, and then adding to them the precision, and even the innovations due to Lenin and Stalin, who were at the same time theoreticians and statesmen. Similarly, the Yugoslav juror extends the Soviet version of this doctrine by presenting it in an even more systematized form and by adding to it doctrinaire views and the experiences of the leaders of their country, who seemed to follow a tidy path in that which is called the "building of socialism." This reason alone would be enough to sanction a summary of the works of R. Loukitch, but this one deserves to be known for another reason. Unlike the fragmentary works of Marx and Engles and the Soviet systems, a bit obscure and often contradictory, it represents a complete compilation of Marxist doctrine on this subject, where all the essential themes, where all the points of detail are gone into further, analyzed, reconsidered, and pushed to their farthest logical consequences. In this report, he renders an indisputably great service to Marxist thought, which, thanks to him, has thenceforth its own doctrine of the state and of law, which until then suffered from big gaps. But at the same time, this work provided, in spite of itself, better and more abundantly than all others, some fundamentals of a reliable criticism of the Marxist school of law and of the state. We will say willingly that, this being so, this task is better served by works less luminous, less methodical, than it is, for example, in the works of Soviet authors, in particular, those of the second period, called "Stalinist."
III. - The Link Between the Law and the State
The state and the law are, according to R. Loukitch, like Hegel and Kelsen, as, in theory, in the works of Marx and Engles, simultaneous phenomena. They were created at the same time because they were given birth by the same social causes and, moreover, were only the constituent elements of the same phenomenon when one is considered more as a normative phenomenon and the other as more worldly. The law is a rule of human conduct which addresses itself to the conscience of individuals and which comes from it besides; the state is a social authority which, by threat of force, assures respect for this rule which, by the effective employment of this force, re-establishes its value in case of violation. If the rule of law is juridical, it is precisely because it carries a constraint, that is to say the intervention of the state: without this material element, it is indistinguishable from other rules of conduct (moral, religious and political) whose effectiveness, on the social plane, is sometimes nil, sometimes partial. But, for its part, the state is also a legal category, because its organization and function, while being protected by being merged with it through a social force, is statutory, is "produced" by rules of law without which it would not be either visible or acted upon. Thus, there is no law without the state and there is no state without law, it amounts to, when all is said and done, that these are different names for denoting a single object(4).
But apart from this legal identity, the law and the state have the same social relationship. Thanks to this relationship, they are indisputably twins. If, then, there exist minds that can deny that it is a matter of the same phenomenon having two names or viewed from different sides, it is impossible for them not to understand that the law and the state, born at the same time, constantly depend upon one another in a direct manner at the same time and on the causes which governs their birth. Just as one disappears, the other follows automatically into nothingness or if their common cause should vanish, both of them immediately lose their reason for being and do not survive it at all.
However, this common cause or this relationship is not society as such; it does not matter which society or all of human society, as it means the course of idealistic thought inherited from the Romans. It is a certain form of society, a society in a state of specific evolution, one that is differentiated into social classes, classes where one exploits the other (or others) economically and which, by this act, are antagonists, opposing one another, arrayed one against the other, who fight mercilessly and without respite, one to maintain his domination and the other to dislodge its rival and its control in its turn. The appearance of law and of the state, without being the product of society, is then the product of a certain economic structure of it. This structure has, admittedly, as its basis a social fact: it is the passage of a simple society, where everybody develops his occupation as he sees fit, to a differentiated society, where one sees a division of social labor. But one or the other of these forms are, in the final analysis, of an economic character. In the simple or primitive society, the means of production are at the disposal of everyone (hunting, fishing) and no one is exploited by his fellow man. In the differentiated society, which represents a superior stage of evolution, these means (earth, industry) are appropriated by some, generally the stronger or the more skillful, to the detriment of all the others. It is a society of economic inequality and consequently social inequality, of which all human history, from antiquity up to modern times, with the sole exception of primitive societies, supplies us with examples.
IV. - Conditions for the Emergence of the State and the Law
Since it was not born at the same time as society, that it is a product of a stage of evolution of the latter and that, consequently, it comes later, the state and the law should not be confused with society and even ought to be opposed to it, in the sense that it is a state (and a law) of class. One could say that, in these conditions, it turns away from society, it becomes independent of it, it towers over it, that it "alienates" it. Two consequences result from this observation: 1st the state has not always existed where there was society, and, 2nd it may come to an end before the latter.
This relationship between the state and the law, on one hand, and society on the other, emerges from a scientific analysis of the social structure as it appears, in the first place, in its primitive state, native, and then, in its evolved state, that of civilization. This analysis is advocated by historical materialism. At once sociological and dialectical, it is the only one capable of giving an exact account of social phenomena such as the state and the law. Based on the strict observation of reality, starting from principle, opposed to that of Hegel and his school, that it is matter which commands the spirit, the reality which gives birth to the idea. Admittedly, the truth that 2 plus 2 equals 4 does not exist outside of a consciousness. In nature, there are only objects which may be or not be numbered 4. But if there are really 4 of these, this number would be noted by the conscience which, from this moment, but not before, would be able to engage in reasoning, construct concepts, to make an idea appear. It might say, for example; 2 plus 2 is 4, 3 and 1 is 4, etc(5). In the social plane, the substance that is shown by the production of material goods; this is due to the work of a person, and it is this which distinguishes him from the animal. If, indeed, man separates himself from the animals and if he has become what he is, it is thanks to his creative work, that is to say the exercise of his social duties, of which the main one is the productive economic function, it is, in a word, thanks to his position as man the maker(6).
But if this factor determines the ideas and the behavior of the individual, it simultaneously determines the structure of society. And that is how, following the different modes of production which succeeded one another throughout the course of history, there were different types of societies. There was, to begin with, a society without classes, where everybody was in the same situation in relation to the means of production, that is to say, equal, independent from each other, because these means were free, they were within the reach of all. This society was that of the "tribes," before civilization, though some specimens of it still exist these days. It is totally ignorant of law and the state, for the simple reason that its economy, based on the non-ownership of the means of production, rules out all need of constraint and oppression at the level of the poor(7). Admittedly, it contains certain rules of conduct, but these rules are not legal; they are moral or common(8). Later, under the influence of the division of social work, primitive society split into classes, two in principle, of which one seized the means of production and appropriated them, thereby dispossessing the other class of them, which it began to exploit. It is at this moment that the law and the state was born; whose existence continues under different forms, up to today. This moment represents a dialectical leap, the most significant social revolution that humanity has ever known: the passage of the stateless society without either state or law to the society with state and law or that of non-state and of non-law into their being, into their assertion(9). The subsequent changes which, under the impetus of new productive forces, have resulted in changes of means and modes of production, have all been of a lesser importance, because they only brought modifications to the law and the state already in existence, without abolishing them nor replacing them by other things: they have left intact the essential features of a class society, based on private ownership of the means of production which have often changed nature and handiwork, but never the legal character. This is shown in the era of slavery (antiquity), that of feudalty (Middle Ages), and that of capitalism (modern times). A careful examination of each of these ages, in many ways different, clearly shows that they are governed by a permanent phenomenon, namely; on one hand, the exploitation by those who have of those who have not and, on the other hand, the constant battle of one against the others (class struggle) having as its object the possession of the means of production, which orders the structural basis of a given society. If the enumerated eras follow one after another and if they are considerably differentiated, it is because the class struggle which characterizes them is, by virtue of historical necessity, driven by progress(10), ended sometimes by the victory of the exploited and that these, once masters of the means of production, have become, in their turn, exploiters of the dispossessed class. At each of these historical turns, the accession of a new class represents a certain progress in relation to the reign of its rival, because it brings a mode, a type of more advanced production, more in accordance with technical progress and with the general aspirations of society, because it finds itself enriched. It is on this basis that one can say that the new exploiting classes are always progressive in relation to the former, which, above all towards the end of its rule, is reactionary and backward looking: the feudal lords have been progressives in relation to the patricians of ancient Rome, the bourgeoisie of modern society have been progressives in relation to the feudal lords. And even the system of slavery has been an improvement in comparison to the egalitarianism of primitive society, which is the infant stage of humanity(11).
V. - The Role of the State
In these conditions of constant struggle, the dominant class, threatened at once by the dispossessed and the reactionary class, (who, for a certain time, can not resign themselves to their defeat) and the ascending and progressive class, which is born, in accordance with dialectical principles, it is obvious, even within the dominant class, that it must secure a means of organized force, repressive and oppressive at the same time. But this means nothing other than the rule of law, that is to say the normative command and social sanction, one enacted, the other maintained by the state. Consequently, if there were not, within a class society, any law and state, this society would be condemned to perish, because the two classes which form it would then fight to their mutual extermination and the disappearance of the society itself. But if, on the other hand, the society had not been divided into classes in which conflict is centered on the means and modes of production, there would not have been law and the state that, under this hypothesis, would have had no reason to exist, like that which has been seen previously during the time of the tribal societies, called primitive. This truth being stated, one can deduce from it an appropriate definition of law and the state.
The law is, by its class essence and by its content, the totality of the social norms which regulate the relationship of domination by the ruling class towards the subjugated class, in the part of this relationship which could not be maintained without recourse to oppression exercised by the securely organized state(12). It is therefore the instrument which, in the class struggle, serves to safeguard the interests of the dominant class(13) or, if one prefers, to maintain the social inequality for the profit of the latter(14).
As for the state, it is the organization of the dominant class by which it assures itself a monopoly of oppression in the society where it lives and more particularly over the exploited class, in order to safeguard its class interests(15). It never merges, therefore, with the dominant class. It is only its organization and only expresses its essence(16). Indeed, an entire class only manages to enter the composition of the state. It has its representatives, its "core" thinking, which interprets its wishes, protects its interests, and assures its reign(17).
If sometimes one sees the state oppress not only the subjugated class but even its own members, it does not at all mean that it has lost its class character: it simply signifies either that it exerts by that a social function which is not, properly speaking, legal (hygienic measures, public health, etc.) or that it strikes at the individuals who, in a case of this type, have lost the precise idea of their class interest(18). But the state can appear equally as the organization of several classes, who have concluded an alliance against their common enemy: the demoralized or the defeated. In this case equally, one class predominates either in actual fact or for all intents and purposes, and, in this latter case, its guiding role will end up by appropriation for good when the alliance in question would have lost its purpose(19).
Of course, it sometimes happens that the group in power takes measures contrary to the interests of its class, which favors those of the opposing class, or albeit only protects the interests of one part of its class (the banking bourgeoisie, agricultural bourgeoisie, and capitalist or socialist bureaucracy.) In the first case, the state can stay a class state, that is to say a state in the proper sense of the term, if the measures taken have been dictated by the concern for a most efficacious defense of the interests of the dominant class (for example, the social legislation in certain capitalist states.) In the second case, it is a matter of a state crisis, to which the dominant class can put an end by overthrowing the group in power(20). If this abnormal situation can not be straightened out, we then witness the transformation of the ruling group and a new ruling class: it detaches itself from its original class which becomes an oppressed class, and becomes a class itself. A typical example of this phenomenon is the rule of the bureaucracy. Regarding this, Engles cites the case of the absolute monarchy, which, toward the end of the feudal period, maintained a kind of equilibrium between the feudal class and the bourgeoisie, and that of Napoleon III, who played the arbiter's role between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Today, one can cite the case of the USSR, governed by a bureaucracy which can not be considered as being part of the proletariat, although it may be descended from it, and which has all the characteristics of a caste(21).
All this, however, is only an illusion and does not diminish at all the class character of the states in question. The absolute monarchy was feudal all the same, the reign of Napoleon III was middle-class in spite of everything. As for the Soviet Union, its bureaucracy, insofar as its existence is not indispensable to the proletariat, is an autonomous social group. Being given that it is in possession of the means of production and has interests opposed to those of the proletariat, it has all the attributes of a social class: if it differs a little bit from that which one calls a class in the traditional sense of the word, it is because its formation is not yet final(22).
VI. - The Idea of Class
To understand the definition of the law and of the state as materialistic categories, it is advisable to specify the meaning of the idea of class. It is not class no matter what group of individuals, organized or disorganized, which fights for power or holds it. Nor a band of criminals, nor an army of occupation nor a party or a vast political movement are not, by themselves, a social class. To have this quality and become a constituent of the idea of the state and of the law, a group of individuals must be, besides the fact that it allows itself to be part of the population, bearer of a mode of production which characterizes it and which itself actively participates in social production, either by helping itself to the work of others, or by selling its own work(23). Evidently, nothing prevents a group which, first of all, does not have the quality of class, from acquiring it afterwards, if it ends up by filling the mentioned conditions. Just as this quality was missing, the first time, from the barbarian invaders of ancient Rome and from the Spanish colonizers of South America, where their activities bordered on pillage and parasitism, their power in these countries could not, in spite of all appearance, be considered as a state nor their commandments as a law, before they have made use of a new mode of production(24). Likewise, the present Vatican state, internationally recognized as such, is not a state, because it does not consist of social classes and does not protect, thereby, within its borders, a class interest(25). It is nothing other than what is called the international public law. The subjects, that is to say the different states, which are called upon to observe it or to impose it, could not be considered, in their mutual relations, as classes which economically exploit one another, this is not a right. It only would have this quality if all the individual states formed a universal state, but then it would no longer be an international law, it would simply be a national law, or simply a law(26).
VII. - The Possibility of Autonomous State Action.
But if it is correct that it is the mode of production, the economic base of society, that determines the essence of the state and of the law, this does not have to mean that these are uniquely determined by this cause. Such a conception would, as a matter of fact, come from economics or economic materialism; it would be foreign to historic materialism and therefore, wrong. Apart from the mode of production, there exist other factors, not essential, it is true, but which act on the state and the law quite often in a sense opposed to the effect of economic factors, which thereby diminishes its effects. The state and the law can then acquire a relative independence in relation to their social base, they can show an "autonomous movement" according to an expression of Engles(27). One can say that, because they strengthen it, they make possible a given mode of production. Without their influence, this mode would be unstable, it would suffer incessant strikes on behalf of the exploited class in the bourgeois state and of the dominated class in the socialist state. Owing to their oppression, the state and the law eliminate or limit this possible activity of the subjugated class, and thus strengthen the means of production in question. Likewise, when the state and the law favors the development of the productive forces and permits social progress: then they are progressives; when they check this development and this progress, then they are reactionaries(28). If, then, the social structure made of antagonistic classes induces the state and the law as a means of social conflict and its direction, the state and the law exert, for their part, an influence on this structure, and strengthens it. The infrastructure gives birth to the superstructure, of which it determines the character and the face, but it is not without being under the influence of its after-effects. Only the proletarian state, which is a state which withers away and which, as a consequence, is not a state in the proper sense of the word, does not strengthen the class structure of its society, on the contrary, it contributes to the suppression of this structure and to the disappearance of the classes in general(29).
VIII. - The Differentiation of a Communist and Socialist Society.
Since it is private ownership of the means of production which is at the source of the state and of the law, the day that this ownership is abolished, the state and the law will compulsorily disappear. This day will arrive with the coming of communism, which will mark a second big qualitative passage, but the inverse of the first: that of the state and the law to non-state and non-law. In other words, the state and the law "liberate" themselves, they return to the society, which will absorb them, in order to find and strengthen itself. The rules of conduct which one encounters within this future society would have the same character of those of the primitive society: they would be moral rules, customs, technical precepts, habits; individuals would observe them spontaneously, because they are just and, as such, freely accepted by everyone, because, at this juncture, they will be the manifestation of a true general interest. The public services, like health, education, transportation, communication, and even the police, necessitated by reason of a few rare cases of disobedience, will be furnished by all citizens in turn. This society will be a society of equality and of liberal economics and social integration. Its members will be equal because they will be paid, not according to their abilities but according to their needs; they will be free, because they will not be subject to any constraints. But this society will not be a democratic society; it would not be subject to the rule of anyone, not even to that of the whole people. The disappearance of the law and of the state thus also entails that of democracy. There will be a reign, but this will be a reign over things, not over people.
The coming of this society, which is by no means an ideal society, but well and truly the necessary consequence of an historical evolution, will be preceded by a type of intermediary society, which is that of socialism. Under the impetus of the working class, exploited by that of the bourgeois capitalist, but which, at one stage of development, represents a new productive force and brings a new mode of advanced production, the bourgeois society gets out of the way of the socialist society: this one, embodied by the proletariat, will abolish the private ownership of the means of production, that it will collectivize and thereby prepare the way for the abolition of social classes, which are the consequences of it. This revolutionary event, without a doubt the most important of all those which have been seen since the disappearance of the first classless society, will not have, however, the import of the two essential qualitative passages previously indicated: the state and the law will be maintained, thus there will be a socialist state and law.
A number of countries, of which Yugoslavia is one, today offers a picture of this intermediate society.
However, the socialist state and law are, by their structure and their purpose, very different from the bourgeois state and law, like, moreover, from all the previous types of law and state. The will of the class which they express and assert is not an exploiter class: it has not appropriated the means of production, it has collectivized them. The class which is forced to submit to this will is not an exploited class: there are no more people on whom to impose this condition. The proletariat is therefore nothing but a dominant class, that which is in possession of the means of command and constraint, that is to say the state and the law, while the bourgeoisie is only a subjugated class. On the other hand, the domination is here exercised by a large majority of individuals and only a weak minority suffers. Finally, domination and submission are destined to disappear, as well as the law and the state which results from it. Better yet, they must wilt every day, wither away progressively, until their complete disappearance which marks the end of socialism and the beginning of communism. Under these conditions, the socialist state is and is not a state, socialist law is and is not a law(30). Strictly, they are, because they have all the characteristics: they are the means of oppression of one class by another. Materially, however, they are it also but to a lesser degree because, on one hand, the class in power only dominates, without exploiting and the ousted class only obeys, without being exploited an that, on the other hand, instead of aspiring to be lasting, they work actively toward their own demise. From this fact alone, the socialist state and law are more humane than those preceding them. But at the same time they are more democratic, because the dominant class, considered as the old exploited class, represents the majority and no longer the minority of society. They are more liberal, because all the citizens who make up this society, proletarian as well as bourgeois, are from now on free from all exploitation. But there is no worse slavery than the fact of being exploited without the possibility of freeing oneself(31).
The socialist law and state are not, therefore, a law and a state in the classic sense of the term: it is a law and a state which is disappearing and which, by this fact, changes endlessly. It is above all a dynamic law and state, but in the sense of a descent, not a climb(32). They are, in other words, in permanent revolution.
All the same, there's hardly less of it; this law and this state are a law and a state of class, they express the will of the proletariat and defend their interests, which consist of maintaining the spreading the collectivization of the means of production, to make the bourgeois class disappear along with all the different classes of society, to make the law and the state progressively disappear, to prepare, finally, for the coming of a communist society. Like the bourgeois state and law, it is a law and a state of inequality, and it is in this spirit that it is advisable to understand a socialist rule and law and the role of the courts which interpret and apply it(33).
IX. - The Characteristics of a Socialist State.
The abolition of classes in the socialist system is certain and, besides, it happens quite slowly. From the moment when the bourgeoisie is prevented one day more and increasingly radically from continuing the exploitation of the proletariat and that the latter does not intend to become a class of exploiters itself, the extinction of the bourgeoisie automatically brings about that of the proletariat, which is proletariat only because there is a bourgeoisie and there will only be from now on, instead of one and the other, a single society, united again, of workers equal in law and in fact. It is known that this phenomenon appeared in the USSR barely 18 years after the October revolution, that is to say in 1936 (the date of the promulgation of the constitution called "Stalinist") and in Yugoslavia around 1953 (the date of the promulgation of the new Yugoslav constitution) thus in an even shorter time.
However, the socialist law and state have not even disappeared for all that neither in the USSR nor in Yugoslavia. Why? Because, first of all, says R. Loukitch, in using in part the arguments of soviet authors of the second period, like every dominant class, the proletariat needs to strengthen its means of production, to perfect it, to get it into their habits, to make it indisputable and, to reach it, it needs time, more maybe than its predecessors, because this mode of production represents a novelty which disrupts old habits. On the other hand, the equality which socialism proposes to establish in the course of its construction is not yet close to seeing the light of day. Because of still insufficient production, there is still not enough material goods for each person to be compensated according to his needs. One is therefore always obliged to be confined to socialist principles: to each according
to his merits. But the merits of each are very variable. There exist intelligent people, gifted, workers and those who are not or are less, there is intellectual work and manual work, the city dwellers and the peasants, the administrators and administrated: there always exists, therefore, the rich and the poor and the danger that some appropriate the surplus of others work to become their exploiters. However, these different social groups can not be considered classes except in a limited sense. By their composition, they are indeed unstable and their instability is due to the fact that no one has a monopoly on intelligence and aptitude. However, whatever their dissimilarity with true classes, their mere existence is enough that the states should be maintained, in order to exercise its monopoly of constraint against whoever would attempt to strike a blow at socialist institutions. Lastly, the external factors known by the name of "capitalist encirclement" may, to a certain extent, require the maintenance of the state (and of the law)(34). In these conditions, it is difficult to set the time when that which up to now would be considered as a state (and a law) will cease to exist(35).
X. - The Evolution of the USSR: in conflict with Yugoslavia.
According to R. Loukitch, history has never known but two typical socialist states. These are the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) and the Popular Federated Yugoslav Republic (P.F.Y.R.)(36). These two states are, however, very different according to him and the differences that exist between them are to the benefit of his country. His thesis is the following.
The progressive abolition of the bourgeoisie in the USSR should have normally led, according to a classless society, at least to the beginning of the withering away of the state, being given that the different groups which exist in the new society are not, so to speak, opposed to each other, at least, are not in a way as sharp as were opposing classes in the past and as a consequence of that, they no longer justify the maintenance of old functions and old authority of the state (and of the law). This is exactly the opposite of what we witnessed, however, in this country. Since the October revolution and after a period of relaxation known by the name of the "New Economic Policy" (N.E.P.), the Soviet state only grew stronger, in handling not only productive relations which alone make up the true competence of the state, but even the whole social life. In 1936, which must have been the year of the first measures in favor of its withering, Stalin said, one remembers, with the cynicism which characterized him, that the Soviet state was never as strong, but that this force was indispensable to it for better enabling the state to disappear(37). Since the death of the dictator, in spite of certain "destalinization" measures, nothing substantial has even been done in this respect.
The reason for this state of things rests in the fact that the soviet managers, coming from the proletariat, had grown away from it and were estranged from it, by forming an autonomous group of individuals, having their own interests, different from those of the proletariat and often opposed to them. This group has become a powerful bureaucracy which, instead of democratizing it, has bureaucratized the Soviet state, instead of making it a state which disappears, they have made it a totalitarian state such that it is impossible to find a similar example in history. The bourgeoisie, which, after the October revolution, had been an oppressed class, once extinct; it is the proletariat, the class of workers and peasants, it is the working people entirely, who have taken its place and it is the bureaucracy which has taken not only the old role of the proletariat under the revolution, which had been that of subjugation, but even that of the bourgeoisie before the revolution, which had been that of the exploiter. And R. Loukitch, to quote from the official theoreticians of Yugoslav marxism-leninism:
"The soviet society differentiates itself more and more; it is composed, on one hand, of workers and wage earners in general and, on the other hand, a caste of bureaucrats, well paid, without scruples, fickle, deceitful and brutal"(38).
"Thus, the two classes, workers and peasants, are in reality exploited and tyrannized by the same masters: the bureaucratic caste, in relation to which they find themselves in the same situation"(39).
"Considered from the point of view of the historical evolution of humanity and of communism, this state of affairs has pushed the Russian state far from socialism and communism. However, it has certainly not made more progress on this road (one could even say that it has made less) than a good number of developed capitalist states (and even under-developed) which, thanks to the development of modern capitalism, today finds themselves on the doorstep of socialism"(40).
The social system of the Soviet Union is not, therefore, a socialist system: it is a system of state capitalism(41).
To not imitate the baneful example of this country, there is but one way: scrupulous adherence to the teachings of Marxist-Leninism. Lenin has said:
"The workers, after having won political power, will break the old bureaucratic apparatus, demolish it to its foundations, leave nothing of it, not a stone, and replace it by a new apparatus consisting of these same workers and employees. To prevent these latter from becoming bureaucrats the meticulously detailed measures of Marx and Lenin will be undertaken: 1st not only eligibility, but removability at any moment: 2nd salaries that will not be higher than those of the worker; 3rd immediate adoption of measures in order that everyone fulfills the supervisory and oversight functions, that everyone becomes for a time "bureaucrats" and due to this fact no one can become a bureaucrat"(42).
Or again:
"Under socialist rule many of the democratic aspects of the 'primitive' will necessarily be revived, because, for the first time in the history of civilized society, the mass of the population raises itself to an independent participation, not only by votes in elections, but in daily administration. Under socialist rule, everyone will govern in his turn and quickly accustom themselves to no one governing"(43).
In other words, to avoid the bureaucratization of the socialist state, which represents the greatest danger for the proletariat, it is necessary to proceed with its democratization, that is to say make the working masses participate besides in public administration as well as the management of the national economy, in taking from the state, one by one, its old functions on behalf of society. It is only in this way that the socialist state will be able to remain, while it exists, a proletarian state and that it will be in a position to wither away, to completely and permanently disappear. Now it is precisely this which has been done in Yugoslavia, thanks to the Titoist experience, which is a faithful and logical application of Marxism-Leninism.
The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 has formulated the basis of a centralized state, analogous to that of the Soviet Union. Its historic task having been accomplished, after the collectivization of the means of production (nationalization of enterprises, cooperativiziation of agriculture) and the disappearance of the bourgeois capitalist, it has been replaced, in 1953, by a new constitution, whose role is to reorganize this state on a new basis, in order to conform to new developmental conditions. The reform has borne at once on the organization of public powers and the economic system. It has decentralized the first, by introducing the local autonomies as large as possible, and has democratized the second, in making the laborers and wage earners participate in the economic management of the country.
It is to the working people that all the power belongs from now on in the Yugoslav Republic. It is exercised politically through the intermediary of its elected representatives, who they send to the federal national assembly, to that of each federal republic, to the district committee and that of the local council. All these representative organs being the legislative body, it is from their womb that come the executive organs, namely: the Executive Council (old central government) the Executive Council of each Federal Republic (old regional governments) those of the district and those of the locality. Parallel to political power, the people actively participate in economic power because beside each national assembly or popular committee, there is an assembly or committee of producers, these being elected by the producers directly and not by all the citizens (a necessary infringement on universal suffrage.) Besides, each economic enterprise has a worker's council, which manages the enterprise and participates in the profits, or at least in control of their use. It is the famous self-management of workers' enterprises which gives pride to Yugoslav management and which exasperates their Soviet counterparts(44). By the principle of the unity of power, concentrated entirely in the hands of the working people, which characterizes a socialist state, corresponding at present to the unity of work, according to which the management of the economy and the administration of the society must be established directly by the workers themselves(45).
This system is the only one capable of effectively combatting bureaucracy and of preparing the way for the disappearance of the state. The pyramidal network of elected bodies that it anticipates is intended, in effect, to assure that in a proletarian state, the democratic elements will predominate over the bureaucratic ones. However, all the dangers of bureaucratization are not eliminated by it for all that. First of all, these organs are of a political type, of a pretty low professional and intellectual level. Then, the representatives of the people risk bureaucratizing themselves in their turn. The removability is a real measure of avoiding this risk, but it is insufficient. Professional politicians, in spite of their qualifications and removability always end, especially if their pay is higher than that of the workers (which is, in part, necessary because of their specialization) by separating themselves and bureaucratizing themselves. It is, principally, to redress these inconveniences that it was thought to create those direct producer committees. This system permits, indeed, the lessening of the economic power of the bureaucrats, real or potential, by giving them, in large part, to the society, that is to say, to the working people. It will permit in the course of events, until the conditions of production become more favorable, the doing away with the division of social work, which is the last wall in front of equality. And when, thanks to this system, all the individuals are equalized, when all the classes and other social differences have disappeared, the state, which is the guardian of these inequalities, will disappear in turn(46).
This felicitous solution to the problem of the proletarian state in Yugoslavia has resulted from thoughts inspired by the last stage of state capitalism. One has noted, indeed, that the political economy of a proletarian state must not tend to create and favor a propertied state but, on the contrary, to make of this property a social ownership, to pass it without delay to the working people, and take it away from the state and the bureaucracy(47). The economic functions of this state are then the first suited to be transferred to the society, that is to say to the "free associations of producers". Those that consist of exercising constraint, that is to say to maintaining order and social peace, are, on the contrary, the last that the society would exercise directly. This will not happen until all the inequalities which still exist and to which the violation of peace and order are due, have disappeared within the society(48).
XI. - The Idea of Party in the Yugoslav State
At the same time as the administrative and economic monopoly, the state and its bureaucracy have lost other functions, which, because of their secondary importance should not enter into their jurisdiction at all. Notably, these are those which touch on intellectual life, on health, on sports, on national insurance, and on political ideology.
About that which concerns this last one in particular, it is known that in the bourgeois state, which has a multiplicity of political parties and in the socialist state, which, in the first phase, is characterized by the single party system, the role of a political party consists, when it is in power, in exercising public powers. It is an organization which brings concrete decisions concerning diverse affairs of state to the agenda and which tries hard to cover these decisions with a legal form(49).
In Yugoslavia an important attempt has been made in this respect. It intends to create a system without political parties or rather a system where they will be nothing more than ideological organizations, that is to say the agents which would no longer have a hold on power. The Communist Party has thus been turned into the communist yugoslav league, with the intention of making it understood that it becomes a simple organization for propagandizing communist ideas. As for the power to bring about concrete political decisions and to fight so that these become acts of state, it has been transferred to the Socialist Alliance of Working People (old popular front) which is not a political party in the strict sense of the term, but a mass organization, destined to include practically all the citizens participating in the exercise of power, in order to teach them to discharge this task as well as possible(50).
It is obvious that this reform goes more in the direction of democracy than that which would be allowed by the multiplicity of political parties.
"The development of socialist democracy does not have to consist, wrote a Yugoslav leader who quotes R. Loukitch, in replacing a one party system with one of several parties, because no matter which system of political parties, they date from the capitalist era. The only party system of dictatorship of the proletariat itself is only a residue of that era, which disappears. It is not a matter then of introducing several political parties into the body of democratic socialism, but, on the contrary, to make wither, at the same time as the state, the system that exists. It is necessary to reject outdated fictions according to which the citizens can not defend the collective interests of the society except through the intervention of parties. Be there many or only one, the parties represent, if only by the fact that they are there, a restriction on the liberty and the initiative of individuals. That is why it is understandable that a people who free themselves from a system of exploitation of man by man and which offers to remove the different forms of oppression in social relationships must, at the same time make a kind of society where all individual will finds its direct expression in corresponding social organs(51).
XII, XIII, and XIV. - Interpretation of the present situation of the Yugoslav State
XII. Although certain of its functions wither, that does not mean that other functions of the state, in its class struggle for socialism, where the old force and the force of the new society confront each other, may not work together, if this is necessary for the safeguarding and the development of socialist ownership and socialist progress. Therein lies a contradiction, but it is a dialectical contradiction of the "new State" (52). However, contrary to the thoughts of Stalin in this connection, the state can well reinforce its activity in the domain of defending its frontiers, without which the beginning of the withering would be prevented anywhere else and, above all, in the economic domain and intellectual life, as it has done in Yugoslavia, in conformity with the teachings of Frederick Englels(53).
XIII. An undertaking which intends to explain the law and the state can not be scientifically valid unless it utilizes the marxist system of work. The conception according to which the state would have existed since the existence of society or that which absorbs the state into the society, in seeing the state in each social organization, including the primitive consanguine community itself, is of no use, because it is incapable of accounting for the specific character of the state in so far as a separate medium of organized oppression of society. When, in other of its variants, the sociology of bourgeois legality makes a distinction between the society and the state, but regards nevertheless that an organized oppression is detectable in no matter what society, it is inaccurate, for the simple reason that history and even the present time offers us examples of societies where the situation is completely different(54).
It's the same thing that this teaching, which sees in the state and the law the expression of the general interest of the society taken in its entirety, consequently claims that they are based on that which is called "solidarity" or social "interdependence".
First of all, such an interest is difficult to conceive of on the social plane. Who would define it? Who would protect it? The class in power can not, all the same, defend the interests of its rival, because it would thus come to act against its own interests, when if it only thinks of those, which is normal and even necessary, it must obligatorily sacrifice those of its adversary (it is a matter, of course, of the essential interests of those who hold the means and modes of production.) If areas of state intervention and legal rule which seem or which are actually in the general interest (prevention of theft and murder, vaccination of the population), it is by mistake that they are brought into the functions of the state and into the subject of the law(55). They are, in truth and they should normally be a matter for the society and not the state, a matter of social rules and not legal ones. Consequently, a large part of the penal code (certain crimes, offenses, fines) the civil code (contracts, liability) and all police measures (civil protection, traffic regulation) are not, properly speaking, legal(56).
Admittedly, one can say that the rules relative to the protection of human life are in the interest of the dominant class, because it needs individuals to carry on its tasks and attend to its goals. But as these norms would not, without a doubt, cease to exist and to apply in a classless society, it is certain that at that moment they would not be legal and that even now, when they occur in a class society, they are not legal by themselves; if they are, they are uniquely in so far as, through an apparent general interest that they seem to protect, they express the particular interest of the class in power(57). About that which concerns theft in particular, it is a personal fact and an exception. If one should organize an entire state exclusively to fight against thieves, this would be absurd and in any case futile, because the society would be capable of defending itself all alone. But if the theft assumes proportions so big as to neutralize it (the society), a state must be formed; one is no longer in the presence of a crime in the strict sense of the term, but of a phenomenon of social importance which arise from objective causes affecting entire groups, if not the social classes themselves(58).
It is indeed truly impossible to conceive that solely for the suppression of thefts or assassinations or for the application of simple police measures that one ought to organize an immense state apparatus, with all that consists of in effort, in concern, in sacrifices; if it is not a question, really, of defending an essential means of sustenance of the society, namely: a specific mode of production, behind which inevitably are found one class (or momentarily several classes) and not the whole society(59).
Besides, who says of what the general interest consists? It is known that in a class society, it is a part and not the totality of the population that exercises the power. Worse yet: this part, far from being the majority of the social body, is nothing but, in the pre-socialist society, a small minority, a handful of exploiters. If, in the course of history, one can say that the dominant class is supported by a majority, it is because, on one hand it appears to be a progressive class and consequently capable of interpreting the general leanings of the social body, that which generally appears at the beginning of its rule, or which, on the other hand, it practices terror (police state) or turns the lack of class consciousness of its adversaries to account (the modern bourgeois state). In truth, it is always a minority and is so by definition, because a majority would not be able to indefinitely exploit a minority, for lack of exploitable resources by the latter. Consequently, this minority is not qualified to define the general interest. Besides, it would not even be to its advantage if it was the opposite of that which it is, that is to say a majority. It is only if all the members of the social body are in power, in a complete democracy, that this would be possible, but then there would no longer be the state nor the law, nor even democracy, because such a government would no longer have subjects and would be, consequently, absurd(60).
When, furthermore, bourgeois tenets liken, by its aims, the state and the law to order and social peace, which corresponds to the alleged general interest of society, one deliberately closes ones' eyes to the reality. The "order" and the "peace" have not the meaning that have been attached to it in the class struggle. It is possible, indeed, that at a given moment they could be more harmful to the society than their opposites. As soon as the society experiences a larger harm by the reactionary order and peace than by the disorder and unrest which bring a new order and a new peace, these are progressive, the existing order and peace, as well as the law which guarantees them, lose all their social value(61). But the weightiest argument against the theory of general interest is this. If it is accurate that the state and the law reformulate it, that would mean that all the individuals composing a society freely accept all the legal rules they are called upon to observe. It is not understood therefore why one must set in motion an entire apparatus of constraint to force them to submit to it, because whoever accepts a rule of behavior spontaneously, performs it in the same manner and this rule ceases in the same way to be legal, there is no longer need for a state to make it respected(62).
The doctrine which has just been explained contains all the postulates of Marxism-Leninism applicable to the idea of the state and the law, while its remarkable clarity allows them to emerge easily. These postulates are, to our mind, four in number, known as: the primacy of reality over ideas; that of class conflict, that of social progress and, in terms of the line of argument, that of justice and equality. As they have already been the object of numerous critical analyses(63), we believe, in spite of the interest that that would produce, it useless to examine them in our turn. There remains, however, the theory of the debureaucratization of the socialist state which is peculiar to Yugoslav thought, although it draws its origins from the founders of Marxism and in particular from Lenin, and which seems to be put into practice in Yugoslavia. However, its critical appraisement would be too long to be incorporated in the present study. We are content to indicate that this debureaucratization has an impact far more modest than the Yugoslav political theorists and lawyers would like. It finds itself, indeed, reduced by the principle of centralization of power, envisioned not by its functional and formal facets, but by its sociological aspects. By virtue of this principle, and contrary to the provisions of Article 2, Paragraph 1, of the 1953 Constitution, as well as official claims that the Communist Party of this country no longer plays, under its new name of the League of Yugoslav Communists, but an ideological and educational role, the sovereign social authority and real power belongs to a single party, organized and functioning as a dictatorial and totalitarian authority. Consequently, the modifications brought to the constitutional and social system of this country, which are introduced as essential, likely to make of Yugoslavia a socialist country sui generis, very different from the Soviet Union, and closer than it to the realization of complete communism, has more an ideological than a real value, the social structure of this country being, in its general outlines and even in a good number of its important details, remaining unchanged.
by K. Stoyanovitch,
research assistant at CNRS
Translated by Joshua Leinsdorf
1. See On the Theories of the Soviet State and Law : Hans KELSEN, The Communist Theory of Law, London, 1955, p. 51 to 147.
2. See, for example : R. LOUKITCH, Basic Studies in the Theory of the State and the Law, 2 volumes (in Serbo-Croatian), Belgrade, 1952.
3. R. LOUKITCH, Theory of the State and the Law. I. Theory of the State. II. Theory of the Law, 2 volumes (in Serbo-croatian), Belgrade, 1953 and 1954.
4. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., T. II, p. 25, 53, 124.
5. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 117.
6. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 63
7. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., T. I, p. 8, 9, 27, 76
8. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 8, 9.
9. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 99.
10. The idea of progress is the controlling concept of Marxism. It is, moreover, expressed, almost defined, in a passage in the works of Engles: "All the historical conditions which follow each other are only transitory stages in the endless development of human society going from the inferior to the superior. Each stage is necessary and consequently justified for the age and the conditions to which it owes its origin, but it becomes obsolete and unwarranted in relation to new, superior conditions which develop little by little in its own womb: it is necessary for it to give way to a superior stage which (in its turn) forms a part of the cycle of decline and death. In the same way the bourgeoisie, by means of large scale industry, of the competition and the world market, dissolving practically all of the old, stable and venerable institutions, likewise this dialectical philosophy dissolves all notions of definitive and absolute truth and the rigid human conditions which correspond to it. There is nothing definitive, absolute or sacred about it; it shows the decrepitude of all things and in all things, and nothing exists for it but the uninterrupted processes of becoming and of the transitional, of endless climbing from the inferior to the superior, of which it is itself only a reflection in the conscious mind." (Friedrich ENGLES, Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical german philosophy, Paris, 1936, p. 10).
11. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. II, p. 136. See also : Friedrich ENGELS, Anti-Duhring, M. Duhring overthrows science, Paris, 1950, p. 188.
12. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 40.
13. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 215.
14. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 305.
15. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. II, p. 37, 74, 91, 159.
16. We have the impression that Frederick Engles, in a passage in his book The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, p. 274 departs from this marxist idea, in asserting that, in the conflict of opposing classes, insoluble on the solely social plane, the state is seen to appear as a third factor which, stronger and more united, raises at the same time the lower classes and the entire society, to impose on everyone its will and its own solution to the conflict in question. It says that although this third factor, completely different from the society and a stranger to it, is all the same this society which, thanks to it or by its absence, finds itself transformed, strengthened, "alienated." From all the evidence, this passage is embarrassing, because it muddles the purity of the marxist conception, according to which the state is not the society, but the representative, the symbol of the class in power, therefore only a part of the society. If one accepts that there are never more than two opposing classes, the state can not be a third factor, but well may be a second factor, of which the only difference between the class which is below it is that it is organized in a manner which is its own, even though it isn't it or if it is it, it is different, that is to say on another plane (social, political, cultural.)
R. Loukitch adopts this passage without any reservations. See his previously cited work t. I, p. 174.
17. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 161.
18. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 161, 223.
19. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 164.
20. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 164, 386.
21. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 162.
22. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 163.
23. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 100-101.
24. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 164.
25. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 164.
26. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 242; t. II, p. 254.
27. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 77, 83.
28. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 83.
29. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 83.
30. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 172 ; t. II, p. 299.
31. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 403 and following.
32. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. II, p. 299.
33. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. II, p. 196 and following.
34. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 406.
35. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 171.
36. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 406.
37. V. Hans KELSEN, op. cit., p. 312.
38. Milovan DJILAS, Contemporary Themes (in serbo-croatian), Belgrade, 1951, p. 13 to 17.
39. Melentije POPOVITCH, What does state capitalism signify in the development of society (in serbo-croatian), in Nasa Sivarnost magazine, No. 2, 1953, p. 14.
40. Milovan DJILAS, op. cit., p. 23. It is known that this theorist, who at the same time is one of the highest dignitaries of the Titoist regime, penalized by his judgments about the USSR, has knowingly thereafter spread them out in his own country, which has earned him the loss of all his official functions and a prison term. See his last book, written in prison and published in the U.S.A.: The new class. An analysis of the Communist system, New York, 1957.
41. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 399.
42. V. I. Lenin, The State and the Revolution, Paris, 1947, p. 99.
43. V. I. LENIN, op. cit., p. 105.
44. Much has been written on this question, as much in Yugoslavia as abroad. See, for example: Josip BROZ-TITO, The Workers' Administration of the Economy (in serbo-croatian), in Communist magazine, No. 4-5, 1950; Boris KIDRICH, Socialist Utopianists on Workers' Boards, in Contemporary Questions of Socialism, Paris, 1952, No. 10, p. 87 and following; Milan SLANI, The Workers' Administration of the Economy, in the same magazine, 1952, No. 13, p. 49 and following; Serge KRAIGUER, The Role of Worker Administration, in the same magazine, 1954 Nos. 25-26, p. 91 and following; Dessimir TOCHITCH, Workers' Boards in Yugoslavia, Paris, 1956.
45. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 440.
46. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 424, 440.
47. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 438.
48. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 443.
49. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 429.
50. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 430.
51. Edvard KARDELJ, Ten years in the working-class revolution (in serbo-croatian) in Communist magazine, Nos. 2-3, 1951. "If socialism signifies the raising of social consciousness, of the role and the importance of the individual in the society, it is not clear that, in these conditions, can the party system - which, in spite of everything, signifies the monopoly of social thought in aid of a handful of political leaders - any longer be the necessary framework to satisfy the democratic needs of the masses, the needs of the social activity of the conscious individual? On the other hand, the parties make no sense except when class struggle exists, within which they behave according to the class interests or the social layer that they represent. In a society where such antagonisms must exist or have already been eliminated, the individuals behave themselves in an entirely different manner, that is to say according to concrete problems posed by the building and the development of their community. Work in freedom and the economic, scientific, cultural and ethical interests and all the others of an individual and of the community will be from now on this prime factor around which take place the fight of opinions. We will see without a doubt divergent views form about them, but they would have nothing in common with the political parties." (Edvard KARDELJ, The role of the socialist alliance, in Communist magazine Nos. 2-3, 1953, p. 99.) See also, Alexandre RANKOVITCH, The Yugoslav Communist League, (its role and its organization) in the magazine Contemporary Questions in Socialism, No. 23, Paris, 1954, p. 1 and following.
52. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 438.
53. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 440.
54. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 140.
55. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. II, p. 215 - 216.
56. R. LOUKITCH, op, cit., t. II, p. 45 - 46.
57. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. II, p. 45.
58. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 205.
59. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 156.
60. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I. p. 404.
61. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. II, p. 53.
62. R. LOUKITCH, op. cit., t. I, p. 189.
63. See, for example : Hans KELSEN, op. cit., p. 1 - 147.